

***United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit***



**APPELLANT'S
BRIEF &
APPENDIX**

76-7507

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DOCKET NUMBER 76 7507

BISWANATH HALDER

v

AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC.

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

+
APPENDIX

PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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BISWANATH HALDER,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

V

AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC.,

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

BISWANATH HALDER

APPELLANT PRO SE

173-17 85 AVENUE

FLOSHING, N.Y. 11365

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ISSUES PRESENTED

1. WHETHER LEAVE TO AMEND A PLEADING IS FREELY GIVEN WHEN JUSTICE SO REQUIRES.
2. WHETHER OPEN DISCLOSURE OF ALL POTENTIALLY RELEVANT INFORMATION IS FUNDAMENTAL IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM OF JUSTICE.
3. WHETHER ATTORNEYS' FEES CAN BE AWARDED TO A CORPORATE DEFENDANT WHO IS VIOLATING THE LAW OF THE LAND.
4. WHETHER THE COMPLAINT CAN BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION WHILE THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN PROSECUTING IT VIGOROUSLY AND DILIGENTLY.

FACTS

THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAS BORN IN INDIA, OF INDIAN PARENTAGE. HE HOLDS A BACHELOR'S DEGREE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA. HE IMMIGRATED TO THIS GREAT COUNTRY IN MAY 1969.

PRIOR TO COMING TO THE UNITED STATES, THE PLAINTIFF HAD GAINED TWO YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE WITH TWO REPUTABLE COMPUTER MANUFACTURERS IN ENGLAND. HE WAS ADMITTED TO THIS COUNTRY AS AN ALIEN WHO IS A MEMBER OF A PROFESSION FOR WHICH THERE IS AN AVAILABLE MARKET FOR HIS PROFESSIONAL SERVICES. 8 USCA 1153 (a)(3).

EVER SINCE THE PLAINTIFF ARRIVED IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY, HE HAS BEEN LOOKING FOR A JOB.

THE PLAINTIFF, IN OCTOBER 1976, COMMENCED

THE INSTANT ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC., BY FILING A COMPLAINT AT THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. IN THE COMPLAINT THE PLAINTIFF CHARGED THAT THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIM EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AS PROVIDED BY TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED BY THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, 42 USCA 20002 ET SEQ., BASED ON ITS FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO EMPLOY HIM AS A PROGRAMMER-ANALYST BECAUSE OF HIS NATIONAL ORIGIN.

AROUND THE SAME TIME THE PLAINTIFF COMMENCED SIX OTHER ACTIONS AGAINST COMPANIES MAKING SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME ALLEGATIONS ASSERTED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.

SINCE APRIL 1975 THE DISTRICT COURT, IN ACTIVE CONCERT AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATE DEFENDANTS, HAS BEEN, IN EVERY POSSIBLE AND EVEN IN SOME

IMPOSSIBLE DAYS, TRYING TO ANNIHILATE* THE
POOR AND HELPLESS PLAINTIFF.

* "FEDERAL COURTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED PLENARY
POWERS [TO ANNIHILATE THOSE WHO TRY] TO
SECURE COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE VII." ALEXANDER
V GARDNER-DENVER COMPANY, 1974, 415 U.S. 36, 45,
94 S.Ct. 1011, 1018.

ARGUMENT

THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF CONGRESS IN ENACTING TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 WAS A PROPHYLACTIC ONE :

"IT WAS TO ACHIEVE EQUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND REMOVE BARRIERS THAT HAVE OPERATED IN THE PAST TO FAVOR AN IDENTIFIABLE GROUP OF WHITE [APPLICANTS] OVER OTHER [APPLICANTS FOR EMPLOYMENT]." GRIGGS V DUKE POWER COMPANY, 1971, 401 U.S. 424, 430-1, 91 S. CT. 849, 853.

CO-OPERATION AND VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE WERE SELECTED AS THE PREFERRED MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THIS GOAL :

"CONGRESS CREATED THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND ESTABLISHED A PROCEDURE WHEREBY EXISTING STATE AND LOCAL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AGENCIES, AS WELL

AS THE COMMISSION, WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE DISPUTES THROUGH CONFERENCE, CONCILIATION, AND PERSUASION BEFORE THE AGGRIEVED PARTY [IS] PERMITTED TO FILE A LAWSUIT." ALEXANDER V GARDNER-DENVER COMPANY, 1974, 415 U.S. 36, 44, 96 S.Ct. 1011, 1017.

THE SAME LINE OF REASONING IS FOUND IN THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN JOHNSON V RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, 1975, 421 U.S. 454, 461, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1720 :

"CONCILIATION AND PERSUASION THROUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, TO BE SURE, OFTEN CONSTITUTE A DESIRABLE APPROACH TO SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BASED ON SENSITIVE AND EMOTIONAL CHARGES OF INVIDIOUS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION."

DURING THE EEOC'S CONCILIATORY AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE, THE EEOC REPRESENTATIVE, MS HEIDI D TAPMAN, MET WITH THE DEFENDANT'S REPRESENTATIVES, M/S GERALD C. ROURKE & DON BHUNKA. THE LATTER ADMITTED TO THE EEOC

THAT THE APPELLANT WAS QUALIFIED FOR THE
JOB HE SOUGHT, THAT THE APPELLEE WAS
DESPERATELY EAGER TO RECRUIT COMPUTER
PROGRAMMERS, AND THAT A JUNIOR PROGRAMMER'S
POSITION WAS OPEN. NONETHELESS, THE APPELLEE
REFUSED TO INTERVIEW THE APPELLANT FOR THE
OPENING (D 27, EXHIBIT F). **

IN SHORT, THE APPELLEE SPURNED
CONCILIATORY SOLUTIONS — A STEP TANTAMOUNT
TO VIOLATING THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE
LAW.

** REFERENCE TO THE RECORD WILL BE MADE BY
DOCUMENT NUMBER ON THE DOCKET SHEET, AND
BY PAGE : D , P .

POINT I

LEAVE TO AMEND PLEADING IS FREELY
GIVEN WHEN JUSTICE SO REQUIRES

THE APPELLANT IS AN ENGINEER, AND A LAYMAN IN MATTERS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THAT "EVEN THE INTELLIGENT AND EDUCATED LAYMAN HAS SHALL AND SOMETIMES NO SKILL IN THE SCIENCE OF LAW." POWELL V ALABAMA, 1932, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 84.

THE APPELLANT'S ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE ORIGINAL CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL ORIGIN DID IN FACT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HIS BEING NON-WHITE (COLOR), NON-CHRISTIAN (RELIGION), AND A NON-CITIZEN (ALIENAGE). WHEN THE APPELLANT REALIZED THE DEFICIENCY IN HIS COMPLAINT, HE MOVED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 42 USC 1981, AND ALSO TO ADD ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF DISCRIMINATION (D 17).

RULE 15(a) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE PROVIDES IN PERTINENT PART THAT
"A PARTY MAY AMEND HIS PLEADING ONLY BY LEAVE
OF COURT . . . ; AND LEAVE SHALL BE FREELY
GIVEN WHEN JUSTICE SO REQUIRES."

THE APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER TO GRANT LEAVE FOR THE FILING OF AN
AMENDED COMPLAINT HAS BEEN STATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT :

"THE APPLICABLE RULE IS RULE 15 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, WHICH
WAS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE AMENDMENT OF
PLEADINGS EXCEPT WHERE PREJUDICE TO THE
OPPOSING PARTY WOULD RESULT." UNITED STATES
V HOUGHAM, 1960, 364 U.S. 310, 316, 81 S.Ct. 13, 18;
SEE ALSO ZENITH RADIO CORPORATION V HAZELTINE
RESEARCH, INC., 1971, 401 U.S. 321, 330-1, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802

MOREOVER, THIS IS PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE
WHEN THE APPELLANT IS APPEARING PRO SE, AND
THE COMPLAINT IS HELD "TO LESS STRINGENT
STANDARDS THAN FORMAL PLEADINGS DRAFTED BY

LAWYERS " HAINES V KERNER, 1972, 406
U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 596, 596; ESTELLE V
GAMBLE, 1976, U.S. , 97 S.Ct. 285, 242.

THE CRITICAL ELEMENT, THEREFORE, IN
DETERMINING WHETHER TO GRANT LEAVE TO FILE
AN AMENDED COMPLAINT IS PREJUDICE TO THE
OPPOSING PARTY. JAKOBSEN V MASSACHUSETTS
PORT AUTHORITY, 520 F.2D 810, 813, CA 1 1975;
CLARK V UNIVERSAL BUILDERS, INC., 501 F.2D 324,
339, CA 7 1974, CERT. DEN. 1974, 419 U.S. 1070,
95 S.Ct. 657; HAGEMAN V SIGNAL L.P. GAS, INC.,
486 F.2D 479, 484, CA 6 1973; HONEY V UNITED
STATES, 481 F.2D 1187, 1190, CA 9 1973; STRAUSS V
DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY, 406 F.2D 1152, 1155,
CA 2 1968; HANSON V HUNT OIL COMPANY, 398
F.2D 578, 582, CA 8 1968; SUNRAY OIL CORPORATION
V SHARPE, 209 F.2D 937, 939, CA 5 1954;
KERRIGAN'S ESTATE V SEAGRAM & SONS, INC.,
199 F.2D 694, 696, CA 3 1952.

IN THE INSTANT ACTION, NO PREJUDICE WOULD

RESULT TO THE APPELLEE IF THE APPELLANT IS ALLOWED TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT.

FURTHERMORE, THE APPELLANT MAY RESPECTFULLY POINT OUT THAT THE "LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS IN [THE AREA OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION] HAVE LONG EVINCED A GENERAL INTENT TO ACCORD PARALLEL OR OVERLAPPING REMEDIES AGAINST DISCRIMINATION," ALEXANDER V GARDNER-DENVER COMPANY, 1974, 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, AND THAT "THE FILING OF A TITLE ~~VII~~ CHARGE AND RESORT TO TITLE ~~VII~~'S ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY ARE NOT PREREQUISITES FOR THE INSTITUTION OF A SECTION 1981 ACTION." JOHNSON V RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, 1975, 421 U.S. 454, 460, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1720

INSPIRE OF THAT THE TRIAL COURT DENIED LEAVE TO THE APPELLANT TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 1981 (D 35), ALTHOUGH THE APPELLANT — WHO IS NEITHER WHITE NOR A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT A RESIDENT

ALIEN WHO FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES — HAS THE SAME RIGHT TO MAKE AND ENFORCE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AS IS ENJOYED BY WHITE CITIZENS. MCDONALD V SANTA FE TRAIL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, 1976, U.S.

, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 ; TAKAHASHI V FISH & GAME COMMISSION, 1948, 334 U.S. 410, 419, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 1142-3.

"OF COURSE, THE GRANT OR DENIAL OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND IS WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT COURT" FOMAN V DAVIS, 1982, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230. SEE ALSO ZENITH RADIO CORPORATION V HAZELTINE RESEARCH, INC. 1971, 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802.

BUT SUCH A DISCRETIONARY CHOICE IS NOT LEFT TO A COURT'S "INCLINATION, BUT TO ITS JUDGMENT ; AND ITS JUDGMENT IS TO BE GUIDED BY SOUND LEGAL PRINCIPLES." UNITED STATES V BURR, 1807, 25 FEDERAL CASES NO. 14,6928, PP 30, 35 (MARSHALL, C.J.).

"OUTRIGHT REFUSAL TO GRANT THE LEAVE [TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT] WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFYING REASON APPEARING FOR THE DENIAL IS NOT AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION ; IT IS MERELY ABUSE OF THAT DISCRETION AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE FEDERAL RULES." ROMAN V DAVIS, 391 U.S. 601, 83 S.Ct. 230.

AS SUCH IT IS APPARENT THAT THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING LEAVE TO THE APPELLANT TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT AND THAT THE SAID DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED.

POINT II

OPEN DISCLOSURE OF ALL POTENTIALLY
RELEVANT INFORMATION IN THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM OF JUSTICE IS BOTH FUNDAMENTAL
AND COMPREHENSIVE

CONGRESS ENACTED TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 "TO ACHIEVE EQUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND REMOVE BARRIERS THAT HAVE OPERATED IN THE PAST TO FAVOR AN IDENTIFIABLE GROUP OF WHITE [APPLICANTS] OVER OTHER [APPLICANTS FOR EMPLOYMENT]". GRIGGS V DUKE POWER COMPANY, 1971, 401 U.S. 424, 429-30, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853

HOWEVER, "THE ACT DOES NOT COMMAND THAT ANY PERSON BE HIRED SIMPLY BECAUSE HE ... IS A MEMBER OF A MINORITY GROUP." *Id.*, 401 U.S. at 430-1, 91 S.Ct. at 853.

"INDEED, THE VERY PURPOSE OF TITLE VII IS TO PROMOTE HIRING ON THE BASIS OF JOB QUALIFICATIONS, RATHER THAN ON THE BASIS OF [COLOR, OR RELIGION, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN]." *Id.*

401 U.S. at 434, 91 S.Ct. at 855.

THE APPELLANT HAS BEEN SEEKING EMPLOYMENT WITH THE APPELLEE EVER SINCE HE IMMIGRATED TO THE UNITED STATES (D 5, P 2, PARA 5). AND ALTHOUGH HIS BACKGROUND — PROFIZIENCY IN ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE, AND ALSO EXPERIENCE IN MINI-COMPUTERS AND IBM SYSTEM 360 (D 27, EXHIBIT A) — PERFECTLY MATCHED A GREAT MANY OF THE APPELLEE'S JOB REQUIREMENTS OVER THE LAST SEVEN YEARS (D 27, EXHIBIT K), HE HAS NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED FOR A JOB (D 26, P3, PARA 6). THE APPELLEE CONTENTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROGRAMMERS AND ANALYSTS HIRED DURING THIS PERIOD POSSESSED QUALIFICATIONS SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF THE APPELLANT (D 24).

THE INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE APPELLANT PRIMARILY CALL FOR THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PROGRAMMERS AND ANALYSTS HIRED BY THE APPELLEE OVER THE LAST SEVEN YEARS (D 8). THE APPELLEE OBJECTED TO ANSWER ON GROUNDS OF IRRELEVANCE, BURDENSOMENESS, ETC. (D 12). AND THE TRIAL COURT

SUSTAINED THOSE OBJECTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT THE INFORMATION SOUGHT WOULD HAVE LIMITED PROBATIVE VALUE ON THE APPELLANT'S CASE (D 18).

YET THE APPELLEE STATES "IT IS JUST AS VALID TO ASSUME, CONCLUDE AND PRESUME THAT [THE APPELLANT] WAS UNQUALIFIED FOR THE POSITION, THAT [THE APPELLANT] WAS THE LEAST QUALIFIED APPLICANT, THAT [THE APPELLANT] WAS WELL QUALIFIED BUT THERE WAS A MORE QUALIFIED CANDIDATE, OR THAT [THE APPELLEE] DECIDED NOT TO FILL THE POSITION FOR ECONOMIC OR OTHER REASONS" (D 25, P 14 & 15).

THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE ANY ASSUMPTION AND PRESUMPTION, THE APPELLANT THEN MADE A REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO ENABLE HIM TO EXAMINE AND COPY THE PERSONNEL RECORDS OF THE COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS AND ANALYSTS HIRED BY THE APPELLEE OVER THE LAST SEVEN YEARS (D 40). THE APPELLEE FURTHER OBJECTED TO THE SAID REQUEST ON GROUNDS OF IRRELEVANCE AND

BURDENSOMENESS (D 41). AND THE TRIAL COURT SUSTAINED THOSE OBJECTIONS (D 48).

IT IS WELL RECOGNIZED THAT A LAWSUIT IS NOT A CONTEST IN CONCEALMENT, AND THAT THE DISCOVERY PROCESS WAS ESTABLISHED SO THAT "EITHER PARTY MAY COMPEL THE OTHER TO DISGORGE WHATEVER FACTS HE HAS IN HIS POSSESSION." HICKMAN V TAYLOR 1947. 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.4. 385, 392.

THE BROAD SCOPE OF DISCOVERY, AS ARTICULATE IN THE TEXT, IS ALSO REFLECTED IN AN OPINION BY JUDGE LEAHY SHORTLY AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE :

"UNLESS IT IS PALPABLE THAT THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT CAN HAVE NO POSSIBLE BEARING UPON THE ISSUES, THE SPIRIT OF THE NEW RULES CALLS FOR EVERY RELEVANT FACT, HOWEVER REMOTE, TO BE BROUGHT OUT FOR ^{THE} INSPECTION NOT ONLY OF THE OPPOSING PARTY BUT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COURT WHICH IN DUE COURSE CAN ELIMINATE THOSE FACTS WHICH ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED

IN DETERMINING THE ULTIMATE ISSUES". HERCULES
POWDER COMPANY V ROHM & HAAS COMPANY,
3 F.R.D. 302, 304, DC DE 1943.

MOREOVER, THE SUPREME COURT MADE IT
CLEAR THAT THE "DISCOVERY RULES ARE TO BE
ACCORDED A BROAD AND LIBERAL TREATMENT," AND
THAT "MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THE RELEVANT
FACTS GATHERED BY BOTH PARTIES IS ESSENTIAL TO
PROPER LITIGATION." HICKMAN V TAYLOR, 329 U.S.
329 U.S. AT 507, 67 S.Ct. AT 392.

BESIDES, "CIVIL TRIALS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
NO LONGER NEED BE CARRIED ON IN THE DARK." 329
329 U.S. AT 501, 67 S.Ct. AT 389. THEREFORE, THE
SUPREME COURT MANDATED THAT "ON ... [TRIAL]
[THE APPELLANT] MUST BE GIVEN A FULL AND FAIR
OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE
THAT THE PRESUMPTIVELY VALID REASONS FOR HIS
REJECTION WERE IN FACT [PRETEXTUAL OR] A
COVERUP FOR A ... DISCRIMINATORY DECISION."
MCDONWELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION V GREEN, 1973,

411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1826.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALSO GIVEN CLEAR GUIDELINES ON THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO A JOB-BIAS COMPLAINANT TO ANY SHOWING OF PRETEXTUALITY :

"STATISTICS AS TO [THE EMPLOYER'S] EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE MAY BE HELPFUL TO A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER [THE EMPLOYER'S] REFUSAL TO [HIRE] [THE APPLICANT] ... CONFORMED TO A GENERAL PATTERN OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST [MINORITIES]". ID., 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. at 1825.

THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANT THROUGH INTERROGATORIES AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS CALLS FOR THE STATISTICS AS TO THE APPELLEE'S EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE. FAR FROM BEING BURDENSOME OR IRRELEVANT, THE INTERROGATORIES AND THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS ARE ENTIRELY "RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER INVOLVED IN THE PENDING ACTION," AND THAT

"THE INFORMATION SOUGHT APPEARS REASONABLY
CALCULATED TO LEAD TO THE DISCOVERY OF
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE." RULE 26(b)(1), FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. SEE ALSO TABATCHNICK
V E.D. SEARLE & COMPANY, 67 F.R.D. 49, 54, DC
NJ 1975; UNITED STATES V INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, 66 F.R.D. 215, 218,
SD NY 1974; SAYRE V ABRAHAM LINCOLN
FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, 65 F.R.D.
379, 382, ED PA 1974; ROTO-FINISH COMPANY V
ULTRAMATIC EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 60 F.R.D. 571, 572,
ND IL 1973; FRANKS V NATIONAL DAIRY PRODUCTS
CORPORATION, 41 F.R.D. 234, 238, WD TX 1966;
UNITED STATES V A.B. DICK COMPANY, 7 F.R.D.
442, 443, ND OH 1967; KAFLAN V INTERNATIONAL
ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL AND STAGE EMPLOYEES,
525 F.2d 1354, 1358, CA 9 1975; RODRIGUEZ V
EAST TEXAS MOTOR FREIGHT, 505 F.2d 40, 53, CA
5 1974; JONES V LEE WAY MOTOR FREIGHT, 431
F.2d 245, 247, CA 10 1970; UNITED STATES V

PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY, 1958, 356 U.S. 677, 682-3.
78 S.Ct. 983, 986-7.

THE COURT SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT "THE
NEED TO DEVELOP ALL RELEVANT FACTS IN THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM IS BOTH FUNDAMENTAL AND
COMPREHENSIVE." UNITED STATES V NIXON, 1974,
418 U.S. 683, 709, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108.

IN ADDITION, "THE EXPERIENCE OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES HAS BEEN THAT
... DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ... IS OFTEN
SUBTLE AND NOT EASILY PROVED. THE CONSEQUENCES
OF SUCH DISCRIMINATION ARE MOST GRAVE, BOTH FOR
THE INDIVIDUAL VICTIM AND FOR SOCIETY AT LARGE.
BOOTH V PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, 66
F.R.D. 466, 473, DC MD 1975.

THEREFORE, THE NECESSITY FOR LIBERAL
DISCOVERY TO CLARIFY THE COMPLEX ISSUES
ENCOUNTERED IN LITIGATION SEEKING TO REDRESS
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION HAS BEEN WIDELY RECOGNIZED
BURNS V THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, 453 F.2d

300, CA 5 1973.

IT IS A WELL-ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE THAT THE SCOPE AND CONDUCT OF DISCOVERY ARE WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE. *BAKER V. F&F INVESTMENT*, 470 F.2d 778, 781, CA 2 1972, CERT. DEN. 1973. 411 U.S. 966, 93 S.Ct. 2147; *MONTECATINI EDISON S.P.A. V. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY*, 434 F.2d 70, 72, CA 3 1970; *SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY V. LANHAM*, 403 F.2d 119, 126, CA 5 1968; *TIEDMAN V. AMERICAN PIGMENT CORPORATION*, 253 F.2d 803, 808, CA 4 1958; *BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST & SAVINGS ASSOCIATION V. HAYDEN*, 231 F.2d 595, 606, CA 9 1956; *SHER V. DE HAVEN*, 199 F.2d 777, 781, CA DC 1952; *ATLANTIC GREYHOUND CORPORATION V. LAURITZEN*, 182 F.2d 540, 542, CA 6 1950.

"BUT THE JUDGE'S DISCOVERY RULINGS, LIKE HIS OTHER PROCEDURAL DETERMINATIONS, ARE NOT ENTIRELY SACROSANCT. IF HE FAILS TO ADHERE TO THE LIBERAL SPIRIT OF THE RULES, [THE APPELLATE COURT] MUST REVERSE." *BURNS V. THIOKOL*

CHEMICAL CORPORATION, supra, 483 F.2d at 305.

THE COURT SHOULD EVER BE MINDFUL THAT
"THE VERY INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SYSTEM DEPEND ON
FULL DISCLOSURE OF ALL THE FACTS, WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE." UNITED
STATES V NIXON, supra, 418 U.S. at 709, 94 S.Ct. at 3108.

AS SUCH IT IS APPARENT THAT THE COURT
BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DISCOVERY TO THE APPELLANT, AND THAT THE
SAID DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED.

POINT III ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE USUALLY AWARDED
TO PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL WHO
VINDICATE POLICIES GRANTED HIGH PRIORITY
BY CONGRESS AND NOT TO CORPORATE
DEFENDANTS WHO VIOLATE LAW OF THE LAND

IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, THE TRADITIONAL
RULE HAS BEEN THAT ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE NOT
ORDINARILY RECOVERABLE AS COSTS. RUNYON V
MCGRARY, 1976, U.S. 96 S.Ct. 2586, 260

"IN SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN RULE, IT HAS
BEEN ARGUED THAT SINGLE LITIGATION IS AT BEST
UNCERTAIN ONE SHOULD NOT BE PENALIZED FOR
MERELY DEFENDING OR PROSECUTING A LAWSUIT, AND
THAT THE POOR MIGHT BE UNJUSTLY DISCOURAGED FROM
INSTITUTING ACTIONS TO VINDICATE THEIR RIGHTS
IF THE PENALTY FOR LOSING INCLUDED THE FEES OF
THEIR OPPONENTS' COUNSEL." FLEISCHMANN DISTILLING
CORPORATION V MAIER BREWING COMPANY, 1967, 386
U.S. 714, 718, 86 S.Ct. 1404, 1407.

"WHAT CONGRESS HAS DONE, HOWEVER, WHILE FULLY RECOGNIZING AND ACCEPTING THE GENERAL RULE, IS ITSELF TO MAKE SPECIFIC AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER SELECTED STATUTES GRANTING OR PROTECTING VARIOUS FEDERAL RIGHTS." ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE COMPANY V WILDERNESS SOCIETY, 1975, 421 U.S. 240, 260, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1623.

"IT IS TRUE THAT UNDER SOME, IF NOT MOST, OF THE STATUTES PROVIDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF REASONABLE FEES, CONGRESS HAS OPTED TO RELY HEAVILY ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT TO IMPLEMENT PUBLIC POLICY AND TO ALLOW COUNSEL FEES SO AS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE LITIGATION." ID., 421 U.S. at 263, 95 S.Ct. at 1624.

"THE AMERICAN RULE HAS NOT SERVED, HOWEVER, AS AN ABSOLUTE BAR TO THE SHIFTING OF ATTORNEYS' FEES EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE OR CONTRACT. F.D. RICH COMPANY V INDUSTRIAL LUMBER COMPANY, 1974, 417 U.S. 116, 129, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 2165; SEE ALSO

HALL V ZOLE, 1973, 412 U.S. 1,4-5, 93 S.Ct. 1943,1945-6

THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE WITHIN THE POWER OF A COURT OF EQUITY TO DIRECT PAYMENT OF AN OPPONENT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES IF REQUIRED BY "DOMINATING REASONS OF JUSTICE." SPRAGUE V TICONIC NATIONAL BANK, 1939, 307 U.S. 161,167, 59 S.Ct. 777,780; UNIVERSAL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY V ROOT REFINING COMPANY, 1946, 328 U.S. 575,580, 66 S.Ct. 1176,1179.

"EQUITY ESCHEWS MECHANICAL RULES ... [AND] DEPENDS ON FLEXIBILITY." HOLMBERG V ARMBRECHT, 1946, 327 U.S. 392,396, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584. "THE ESSENCE OF EQUITY JURISDICTION HAS BEEN THE POWER OF THE CHANCELLOR TO DO EQUITY AND TO MOULD EACH DECREE TO THE NECESSITIES OF THE PARTICULAR CASE." HECHT COMPANY V BOWLES, 1944, 321 U.S. 321,329, 64 S.Ct. 587,592. AS SUCH THE POWER TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES "IS PART OF THE ORIGINAL AUTHORITY OF THE CHANCELLOR TO DO EQUITY

IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION," SPRAGUE V TICONIC NATIONAL BANK, 307 U.S. AT 166, 59 S.Ct. AT 780, AND FEDERAL COURTS DO NOT HESITATE TO EXERCISE THIS INHERENT EQUITABLE POWER WHENEVER "OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS INDICATE THE NEED FOR SUCH A RECOVERY." MILLS V ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY, 1970, 396 U.S. 375, 391-2, 90 S.Ct. 616, 625.

THE SUPREME COURT, IN F.D. RICH COMPANY V INDUSTRIAL LUMBER COMPANY, 417 U.S. AT 129-30, 94 S.Ct. AT 2165, SETS FORTH THREE GENERAL CATEGORIES OF SITUATIONS WHEN THE EQUITABLE POWER TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES IS USUALLY CONSIDERED

1. WHERE THERE HAS BEEN BAD FAITH, VEXATION, OR OPPRESSION. IN THIS CLASS OF CASES THE PUNITIVE ASPECTS PREDOMINATE. SEE ALSO AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO LEGAL AID OFFICES, 87 HARV. L. REV. 411, 419 (1973).

2. WHERE A COMMON FUND HAS BEEN CREATED, OR CLOSELY ANALOGOUS TO THIS, WHERE A DEFINABLE

CLASS BENEFITS FROM THE LITIGATION AND AN AWARD ENABLES THE COURT TO SPREAD THE EXPENSE AMONG ALL WHO BENEFIT. SEE ALSO THE ALLOCATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AFTER MILLS V ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 318, 319 (1971).

3. WHERE THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL THEORY MAY HAVE APPLICATION — THAT IS, WHERE THE LITIGATION WAS INSTITUTED TO VINDICATE A POLICY GRANTED A HIGH PRIORITY BY A CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. SEE ALSO ATTORNEY'S FEES IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 301, 318 (1973).

IN THE INSTANT ACTION, THE CRITERIA CITED ABOVE FOR AWARDED COUNSEL FEES DO NOT LEAN IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY CLEARLY GO IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.

IF WELL KNOWN STATUTORY GUARANTEES CONTINUE TO BE IGNORED OR ABRIDGED, AND INDIVIDUAL VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION ARE FORCED TO RESORT TO COURTS FOR PROTECTION, IT WOULD

BE NECESSARY FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTION OF
SUBSTANTIAL ATTORNEYS' FEES TO BE AWARDED BY
THE COURTS. THE TIME HAS COME WHEN RECALCITRANT
EMPLOYERS CAN FORCE VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION
TO BEAR THE CONSTANT AND CRUSHING EXPENSE OF
ENFORCING THEIR STATUTORILY ACCORDED RIGHTS.
THE FULFILLMENT OF STATUTORY GUARANTEES, WHICH
ALTER A KEY SOCIAL INSTITUTION, AND CAUSES
REPERCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY, IS NOT
A PRIVATE MATTER. UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
COURTS ARE REQUIRED ^{TO REMEDY} FULLY AN ESTABLISHED
WRONG. AND THE PAYMENT OF FEES AND EXPENSES
IS A NECESSARY INGREDIENT OF SUCH A REMEDY.

CONSEQUENTLY, THE SUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFF IN
A JOB-BIAS ACTION "SHOULD ORDINARILY RECOVER
AN ATTORNEY'S FEE UNLESS SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
WOULD RENDER SUCH AN AWARD UNJUST." NEWMAN
V PIGGIE PARK ENTERPRISES, 1968, 390 U.S. 400, 402,
88 S.Ct. 964, 966; NORTHEROSS V MEMPHIS BOARD OF
EDUCATION, 1973, 412 U.S. 427, 428, 93 S.Ct. 2201, 2202.

SEE ALSO PARHAM V SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, 433 F.2D 421, 429-30, CA 8 1970; LEA V CONE MILLS CORPORATION, 438 F.2D 86, 88, CA 4 1971; SCHAEFFER V SAN DIEGO YELLOW CABS, 462 F.2D 1002, 1008, CA 9 1972; BRITO V ZIA COMPANY, 478 F.2D 1200, 1204, CA 10 1973; JOHNSON V GEORGIA HIGHWAY EXPRESS, 488 F.2D 714, 716, CA 5 1974; EVANS V SHERATON PARK HOTEL, 503 F.2D 177, 186, CA DC 1974; SINGER V MAHONING COUNTY BOARD OF MENTAL RETARDATION, 519 F.2D 748, 749, CA 6 1975; EEOC V ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION STEAMFITTERS LOCAL 638, 542 F.2D 579, 592, CA 2 1976; 110 CONG. REC. 12724 (1964) (REMARKS OF SEN. HUMPHREY).

OTHERWISE, "IF FORCED TO BEAR THE BURDEN OF ATTORNEYS' FEES, FED AGGRIEVED PERSONS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SECURE THEIR AND THE PUBLIC'S INTERESTS IN [ENFORCING IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICIES]." BRADLEY V RICHMOND SCHOOL BOARD, 1974, 416 U.S. 696, 708, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2014.

THE APPELLANT IS NOT AWARE OF A SINGLE

INSTANCE (OTHER THAN HALDER V QUOTRON SYSTEMS
74 C 1376, ED OF NY) WHERE A TRIAL COURT HAS
AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO A CORPORATE DEFENDANT,
WHERE THE DEFENDANT'S OBSTINATE, ADAMANT, AND
OPEN RESISTANT TO THE LAW HAS FORCED THE PLAINTIFF
TO RESORT TO COURT FOR PROTECTION.

MOREOVER, "A ROUTINE ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY
FEES TO SUCCESSFUL DEFENDANTS IN DISCRIMINATION
SUITS MIGHT EFFECTIVELY DISCOURAGE SUITS IN ALL
BUT THE CLEAREST CASES, AND INHIBIT EARNEST
ADVOCACY ON UNDECIDED ISSUES." US STEEL
CORPORATION V UNITED STATES, 519 F.2D 359, 366-5,
CA 3 1975. SEE ALSO WRIGHT V STONE CONTAINER
CORPORATION, 524 F.2D 1058, 1064, CA 8 1975.

AS SUCH IT IS APPARENT THAT THE COURT
BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE APPELLEE, AND THAT
THE SAID DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED.

POINT IV DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK
OF PROSECUTION WHILE THE PLAINTIFF
HAS BEEN PROSECUTING VIGOROUSLY AND
DILIGENTLY IS NOTHING BUT JUDICIAL
USURPATION AND OPPRESSION AND CAN
NEVER BE UPHOLD WHERE JUSTICE IS
JUSTLY ADMINISTERED

THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE DISCRETION, UNDER
RULE 41(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT, WITH
PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. LINK V
WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, 1962, 370 U.S. 626, 629,
82 S.Ct. 1386, 1389; REDFIELD V YSTALYFERA IRON
COMPANY, 1884, 110 U.S. 174, 176, 3 S.Ct. 570, 576;
CONNOLLY V PAPACHRISTID SHIPPING LIMITED,
504 F.2d 917, 920, 2A 5 1974; VINDIGNI V
MEYER, 441 F.2d 376, 377, 2A 2 1971; MECKER V
RIZLEY, 324 F.2d 269, 271, 2A 10 1963.

BUT DISMISSAL IS A HARSH SANCTION, AND

SHOULD BE RESORTED TO ONLY IN EXTREME SITUATIONS. SEARVER V ALLEN, 457 F.2D 308, 310, CA 7 1972; POND V BRANIFF AIRWAYS, 453 F.2D 347, 349, CA 5 1972; MCCOMBS V PITTSBURGH-DES MOINES STEEL COMPANY, 426 F.2D 264, 266, CA 10 1970; SYRACUSE BROADCASTING CORPORATION V NEWHOUSE, 271 F.2D 910, 914, CA 2 1959. BECAUSE RULE 41(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE HAS DIRECTLY REVERSED EQUITY'S TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE THAT A DISMISSAL WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF THE MERITS IS ALSO WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE COMPLAINANT. SWAN LAND & CATTLE COMPANY V FRANK, 1893, 148 U.S. 603, 612, 13 S. CT. 691, 694.

COURTS INTERPRETING THE RULE UNIFORMLY HOLD THAT IT CANNOT BE AUTOMATICALLY OR MECHANICALLY APPLIED. AGAINST THE POWER TO PREVENT DELAYS MUST BE WEIGHED THE SOUND PUBLIC POLICY OF DECIDING CASES ON THEIR MERITS. DYOTHERM CORPORATION V TURBO MACHINE

COMPANY, 392 F.2d 146, 149, CA 3 1968; DAVIS V
OPERATION AMICO, INC., 378 F.2d 101, 103, CA 10
1967; COUNCIL OF FEDERATED ORGANIZATIONS V
MIZE, 337 F.2d 898, 901, CA 5 1964. CONSEQUENTLY,
DISMISSAL MUST BE TEMPERED BY A CAREFUL
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION. RICHMAN V
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 437 F.2d 196, 199, CA
1 1971; BROWN V THOMPSON, 430 F.2d 1214, 1217,
CA 5 1970.

WHILE THE PROPRIETY OF DISMISSAL ULTIMATELY
TURNS ON THE FACTS ON EACH CASE, CRITERIA
FOR JUDGING WHETHER THE DISCRETION OF THE
TRIAL COURT HAS BEEN SOUNDLY EXERCISED
HAVE BEEN STATED FREQUENTLY. NAVARRO V
CHIEF OF POLICE, DES MOINES, IOWA, 523 F.2d
214, 216-8, CA 8 1975; REIZAKIS V LOY, 490
F.2d 1132, 1135, CA 6 1974; FLAKSA V LITTLE
RIVER MARINE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 389 F.2d
885, 887-9, CA 5 1968, CERT. DEN. 1968, 392 U.S.
928, 85 S.Ct. 2287.

IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED THAT WHILE DISMISSAL IS A DISCRETIONARY MATTER, THE DECIDED CASES "HAVE GENERALLY PERMITTED IT ONLY IN THE FACE OF A CLEAR RECORD OF DELAY OR CONTUMACIOUS CONDUCT BY THE PLAINTIFF." DURHAM V FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILROAD COMPANY, 385 F.2D 366, 368, CA 5 1967.

THE APPELLATE COURTS FREQUENTLY HAVE FOUND ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN TRIAL COURTS FAILED TO APPLY SANCTIONS LESS SEVERE THAN DISMISSAL. COON V CHARLES W. BLIVEN & COMPANY, 534 F.2D 44, 49, CA 5 1976 ; INDUSTRIAL BUILDING MATERIALS, INC. V INTERCHEMICAL CORPORATION, 437 F.2D 1336, 1339, CA 9 1970.

ALSO, LACK OF PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT, THOUGH NOT A BAR TO DISMISSAL, IS A FACTOR THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND DISCRETION. BROWN V O'LEARY, 512 F.2D 485, 486, CA 5 1975 ; BUSH V UNITED STATES POSTAL

SERVICE, 496 F.2D 42,44, CA 4 1974.

FURTHERMORE, "UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF MODERN GOVERNMENT, LITIGATION MAY WELL BE THE SOLE PRACTICABLE AVENUE OPEN TO A MINORITY TO PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES." N.A.A.C.P. V BUTTON, 1963, 371 U.S. 415,430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336. THEREFORE, THE APPELLATE COURTS HAVE VIGILANTLY PROTECTED THE STATUTORY RIGHTS OF TITLE VII PLAINTIFFS AGAINST ARBITRARY DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINTS BY TRIAL COURTS. MOORE V ST. LOUIS MUSIC SUPPLY COMPANY, 539 F.2D 1191,1194, CA 8 1976; BOAZMAN V ECONOMICS LABORATORY, INC., 537 F.2D 210,212-3. CA 5 1976.

IN THE INSTANT ACTION, THE APPELLANT HAS BEEN VIGOROUSLY AND DILIGENTLY PROSECUTING HIS CLAIM THROUGHOUT. HE COMMENCED THE ACTION ON OCTOBER 31, 1974 (D2). THEREAFTER, HE PROPOUNDED INTERROGATORIES TO THE APPELLEE PRIMARILY ASKING FOR THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PROGRAMMERS AND ANALYSTS ^{Hired} _a SINCE 1969 (D5). THE

APPELLEE REFUSED TO DISCLOSE THE INFORMATION ON GROUNDS OF IRRELEVANCE, BURDENSOMENESS, ETC. (D 12). AND THE TRIAL COURT SUSTAINED THESE OBJECTIONS (D 18). THE APPELLANT FURTHER MADE AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN THE INFORMATION THROUGH PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (D 40). THE APPELLEE AGAIN OBJECTED TO SUCH PRODUCTION (D 41). THE APPELLANT THEN MOVED TO COMPEL THE APPELLEE TO PRODUCE THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS (D 42). THE SAID MOTION WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1976 (D 48). TWO DAYS THEREAFTER THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED THE ACTION FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION (D 49).

THIS UTTERLY ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND WHIMSICAL ACTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IS NOTHING BUT "JUDICIAL USURPATION AND OPPRESSION, AND NEVER CAN BE UPHOLD WHERE JUSTICE IS JUSTLY ADMINISTERED." GALPIN V PAGE, 1873, 85 U.S. (18 WALLACE) 350, 369.

IF SUCH AUTHORITY [TO DISMISS AN ACTION]

EXISTS, THEN, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR ESTABLISHMENT, TO COMPEL OBEDIENCE TO LAW, AND TO ENFORCE JUSTICE, COURTS POSSESS THE RIGHT TO INFLICT THE VERY WRONGS WHICH THEY WERE CREATED TO PREVENT." HOVEY V ELLIOTT, 1897, 167 U.S. 409, 418, 17 S.Ct. 841, 844.

MOREOVER, "THERE ARE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWER OF COURTS, EVEN IN AID OF THEIR OWN VALID PROCESSES, TO DISMISS AN ACTION WITHOUT AFFORDING A PARTY THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING ON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE." SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE V ROGERS, 1958, 357 U.S. 197, 209, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1094.

SUCH ADMINISTRATION OF INJUSTICE "WOULD CONVERT THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT INTO AN ENGINE OF OPPRESSION, AND WOULD MAKE IT DESTROY GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS." HOVEY V ELLIOTT, SUPRA, 167 U.S. at 419, 17 S.Ct. at 845.

THE COURT SHOULD EVER BE MINDFUL THAT

THE "RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ARE DEVISED TO PROMOTE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, NOT TO DEFEAT THEM." *HORMEL V HELVERING*, 1961, 312 U.S. 552, 557, 61 S.Ct. 719, 7.

INDEED, THE VERY FIRST RULE OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DIRECTS THE COURTS TO CONSTRUCT THOSE RULES "TO SECURE THE JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE DETERMINATION OF EVERY ACTION."

"IF RULES OF PROCEDURE WORK AS THEY SHOULD IN AN HONEST AND FAIR JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THEY NOT ONLY PERMIT, BUT SHOULD AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE GUARANTEE THAT BOVA FIDE COMPLAINTS BE CARRIED TO AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS." *SUROWITZ V HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION*, 1966, 383 U.S. 363, 373, 86 S.Ct. 845, 851.

IT IS UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED THAT "WHETHER IN NAME OR NOT, THE SUIT IS PERFORCE A SORT OF CLASS ACTION FOR FELLOW [PERSONS] SIMILARLY SITUATED." *JENKINS V UNITED*

GAS CORPORATION. 400 F.2d 28,33, CA 5 1968.

THEREFORE, "THE TRIAL COURT BEARS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE BY DETERMINING THE FACTS REGARDLESS OF THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFF." BOWE V COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY, 416 F.2d 711,715, CA 7 1969.

"CONGRESS, IN ENACTING TITLE VII, THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A JUDICIAL FORUM FOR THE ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF DISCRIMINATORY EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS. IT IS THE DUTY OF COURTS TO ASSURE THE FULL AVAILABILITY OF THIS FORUM." ALEXANDER V GARDNER-DENVER COMPANY, 1976. 415 U.S. 36, 80, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1025.

AS SUCH IT IS APPARENT THAT THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION WHILE THE APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROSECUTING IT VIGOROUSLY AND DILIGENTLY, AND THAT THE SAID DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED.

CONCLUSION

THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM SHOULD, IN
ITS ENTIRETY, BE REVERSED.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Biswanath Halder
Appellant Pro Se

BISWANATH HALDER

173-17 65 AVENUE

FLUSHING, N.Y. 11365

TELEPHONE : 212-539-2305

DATED : Queens, New York
January 25, 1977

74C 1552

TITLE OF CASE

RISWANATH

VS.

AVIS RENT A CAR. INC.

ATTORNEYS

For Plaintiff Pro Se 173-17 65Ave

Birwanath Halder Fresh

~~161-26-86~~ Crescent Meadows,

~~4 Jamaica, N.Y. 11432 N.Y.~~

657-4256

11365

For defendant: **ENGLISH, CIANCIU**

REISMAN & PEIREZ

~~1501 Franklin Ave~~

~~160 MINNEOLA BOULEVARD~~
~~MINNEOLA, N.Y. 11501~~

Mineola, N.Y. 11501

516-PIL -6565

BASIS OF ACTION: CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

JURY TRIAL CLAIMED

ON

[illegible]

ABSTRACT OF COSTS

RECEIPTS, REMARKS, ETC.

[illegible]

CIVIL

CIVIL DOCKET

HALDER

AVIS RENT A CAR, INC.

74 C 1552

DATE	PROCEEDINGS	
7/3/75	Affidavit of S. Reisman in Opposition filed.	(22)
7-7-75	Affidavit of M. Kathryn Meng in opposition to plttf's motion to amend complaint filed.	(23)
7/11/75	Before MISHLER, CH. J. - Case called- Motion submitted-Decision reserved.	
8-5-75	Notice of motion and memorandum of law to dismiss complaint, ret 9-5-75 at 10 A.M. filed.	(24/25)
8-27-75	Complaint and motion for other relief filed.	(26)
8-27-75	Notice of cross motion to amend complaint, etc., ret 9-5-75 filed.	(27)
9/3/75	Statement under Gen. Rule 9(g) with Affidavit in Opposition to Plttf's Cross-Motion filed.	(28)
9/5/75	Before MISHLER, CH. J. - Case called- Plttf's motion granting plttf leave to amend the complaint, etc. submitted. Deft's motion to dismiss, etc. submitted.	
9/8/75	Letter dated 9/4/75 filed from M. K. Megg to J. Mishler.	(29)
11/19/75	Notice of Motion, ret 12/5/75 filed re: issuance of prel. injunction, etc.	(30)
11/19/75	Memorandum of Law filed.	(31)
12-4-75	Deft's memorandum in opposition to plttf's motion for repleinary injunction filed. (mg)	(32)
12-4-75	Affidavit in opposition of Seymour J. Reisman filed. (mg)	(33)
12-5-75	Before MISHLER, CH. J. --Case called. Plttf's motion for a preliminary injunction submitted. Decision reserved. One week to submit reply affidavits.	---
12-16-75	Supplemental affidavit of the ppltff filed. (mg)	(34)
1-23-76	By MISHLER, CH. J. --MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER dtd 1-22-76 filed. All motions by plttf (to amend complaint, etc.) and deft's motion to dismiss and ofr judgment on the pleadings are denied. (p/c mailed.)	(35)
1-30-76	Notice of appeal filed. Copies mailed to parties and C of A.	(36)
2-3-76	ENTIRE FILE MAILED TO UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS.	
2-9-76	Copy of letter dtd 2-5-76 from Ch. J. Mishler filed re setting date for trial: Feb. 10, 1976 at 10 A.M.	(37)
2-9-76	Acknowledgment received from C of A for receipt of record on appeal filed.	(38)
2-10-76	Before MISHLER, J. - Case called. Adj without date for trial pending completion of discovery.	
2-19-76	Defts. answers to interr. filed.	(39)
3-22-76	Plttf's request to produce filed.	(40)

DATE	PROCEEDINGS	
4-21-76	Deft's answer to request to produce filed.	41
5-11-76	Sten. transcript dtd. 2-10-76 filed in 74-U-1069	
6-29-76	Motion for an order compelling deft to produce documents answer interroga. filed.	42
7-13-76	Notice of motion ret 8-6-76 for an order to compel defts to produce.	43
8-3-76	Affidavit in opposition to motion to compel AVIS to produce documents filed.	44
8-6-76	Before MISHEER, J.- Case called for motion to compel deft to produce documents Motion submitted Decision reserved	
8-26-76	Pltff;s supp interroga filed.	45
9-13-76	Defts answers to supp interroga filed.	46
9-13-76	Copy pf letter dtd. 9-13-76 from Judge Mishler to parties re: case on trail for 9-15-76 filed.	47
9-14-76	By MISHLER, CH. J-Mem of decision & order dtd 9-13-76 denying plttf's motion to compel deft to produce documents filed. Copy of this memo sent to plttf.	48
9-15-76	Before MISHLER, J.- Case called for trial Pltff informs Court he is not ready for trial Trial ordered and begun Non jury Trial concluded The Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the complaint with costs in addition to attys fees in the amount of \$500.00	
9-15-76	Judgment that plttf take nothing of the deft and that the complaint is dismissed with costs and that defts atty recover attyys fees in the amount of \$500.00 filed.	49
9-20-76	Certified copy of order from C of A with copy of opinion attached affirming order of Court with costs to be taxed against appellant filed.	50
9-30-76	Record received from the C of A. Acknow .mailed.	
10-12-76	Motion for an order pursuant to 28 USC 1915 and 42 USC 2000e for the Court to make satisfactory arrangement with the Court Reporters for payment of the cost of the transcript of 9-15-76 etc. filed.	(51)
10-12-76	Notice of appeal filed. Copy mailed to the C of A.	(52)
10-16-76	By MISHLER, CH. J-Memo of decision & Order dtd 10-14-76 re transcript to plttf filed. Copy of this memo to Court Reporters.	(53)
10-19-76	Civil appeal scheduling order filed.	(54)
11-18-76	STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF 09-15-1976	(55)

619901

FILED
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

★ SEP 15 1976 ★

-----X
BISWANATH HALDER,

TIME A.M.
P.M.

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

-against-

155 2

AVIS-RENT A CAR SYSTEM,

74 C 1552

Defendant.
-----X

FILED

This action having come on for trial before the Court, Honorable Jacob Mishler, United States District Judge, presiding, and the plaintiff having informed the Court that he was not ready for trial and the Court having ordered the trial to begin without a jury and at the conclusion of the trial, the Court, making findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record, and directing the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the complaint with costs and awarding defendant's attorney fees in the amount of \$500.00, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the plaintiff take nothing of the defendant and that the complaint is dismissed with costs and that defendant's attorney recover attorney's fees in the amount of \$500.00

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 15, 1976

Lewis Orgel
Clerk

By: Thomas Blustein
Chief Deputy Clerk

Mailed a copy to Meyer,
English & Cianculli, Attorneys,
for Atty. Gen. Rent. & Co. Inc.,
of 160 Mineda Boulevard, Minedo,
New York 11701, by first class
mail.

Brianeth Helden

January 31, 1977